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Abstract: 
This paper examines the performance of recent immigrants to Canada in the labour 
market as revealed in the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB). This is an 
administrative database constructed by Statistics Canada by combining an administrative 
landing file from Citizenship and Immigration with the T1 Family File (T1FF) of income 
tax returns from the Canada Revenue Agency.  As this database now extends to 2012, it 
provides the most current evidence on the impact on the labour market performance of 
recent immigrants of the relatively ambitious immigration reforms introduced by the 
Conservative Government. These reforms involved tighter criteria for skilled workers, an 
expansion of the Provincial Nominee Program, and a tightening up on refugee claims. 
 
The conclusion of the paper is that the overall performance of recent immigrants has 
improved enough to modestly reduce the wide earnings gap that has opened up between 
average recent immigrant and overall earnings. However, the reduction in the earnings 
gap has not been very large given the ambitiousness of the immigration policy reforms. 
There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the Conservative 
Government has continued to pursue a policy of high mass immigration admitting around 
250,000 new immigrants per year right through the 2008-09 recession. Ironically, while 
the Government has cut back on the number of relatively high performing skilled workers 
admitted, it has actually increased the number of live-in caregivers, and their families 
who predominantly are low earning. On the other hand, it is clear that if the Conservative 
Government had not tightened up immigration policy as aggressively as it did, 
particularly by eliminating the backlog of workers admitted under the old less stringent 
criteria, the labour market performance of immigrants would have probably deteriorated, 
instead of improving modestly as it did. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: J23 – Labour demand; J24 – Human Capital; Skills; 
Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity; J61 – Geographic mobility, immigrant 
workers. 
 
Keywords: wages, recent immigrants to Canada, immigration policy, immigrant labour, 
human capital 
 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
When the Conservative Government came to office in January 2006, it inherited a failing 
immigration policy. Since the number of immigrants was increased in the late 1980s, the 
performance of immigrants in the labour market had steadily deteriorated and new 
immigrants had become an increasing drain on government finances. More precisely, in a 
recent study Herbert Grubel and I estimated that recent immigrants imposed a fiscal 
burden of at least $20 billion annually (1.1 percent of GDP) on Canadian taxpayers, 
mainly because the income taxes paid by these immigrants are only about half those paid 
by Canadians, while both groups receive the same benefits from government spending 
(Grubel and Grady, 2011 and 2012). 
 
To deal with the unsatisfactory situation, which threatened to get even worse if the 
growing backlog of accepted, but not yet admitted, immigrants were all allowed to come 
to Canada as permanent residents, the Conservative Government took a very 
controversial step and eliminated the backlog by means of legislation. This angered many 
who supported the admission of all of the previously accepted immigrants. In addition, 
the other most important steps taken by the Conservative Government were the 
introduction of more stringent criteria for Federal Skilled Workers, which were tied more 
closely to employability, and modifying the process for claiming refugee status in-
country, thus facilitating the removal of those pursuing unjustified refugee claims. 
 
At the same time, the Conservative Government has maintained a historically high level 
of immigration of around 250,000 per year right through the Great Recession of 2008-09 
and soaring unemployment, which reached around 9 per cent overall and was almost 
double that for recent immigrants. There were several motivating factors behind the high 
level of immigration including: seeking to appeal to Canada’s immigrant communities; 
meeting the business sector’s demand for a plentiful supply of new less costly workers; 
and responding to provincial governments’ pressure for a greater role in the selection of 
immigrants. 
 
The question that needs to be answered is: how successful has the Conservative 
immigration policy reform been in improving the labour market performance of recent 
immigrants.  The data source that best sheds light on this is the Longitudinal Immigration 
Database (IMDB), which is an administrative database constructed by Statistics Canada 
by combining an administrative landing file from Citizenship and Immigration with the 
T1 Family File (T1FF) of income tax returns from the Canada Revenue Agency. It 
utilizes exact matching record linkage techniques for immigrants who filed taxes at least 
once. The IMDB now covers the period between 1982 and 2012 so it is possible to update 
an earlier assessment, which ended in 2010 (Grady, 2013). An advantage of the IMDB 
over the National Household Survey data that is collected with the census is that it is 
available annually and provides a breakdown of immigrants into all of the various 
administrative categories, which permits an analysis of how the many different 
immigration programs are working and contributing to the overall result.  A drawback of 
the data is that, as an administrative database, it is subject to greater privacy concerns and 
is only fully available to researchers that have been sworn in under the Statistics Act and 
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allowed to work under the control of Statistics Canada. Fortunately, however, some 
summary tabulations have been made available on Statistics Canada’s website that can be 
used to assess the labour market performance of the various streams of immigrants. This 
paper makes use of that data to draw some conclusions about the success of Conservative 
immigration reform. 
 
The Data 
 
The two reference years for studying the success of Conservative immigration policies 
are 2006 and 2012. The immigrants included in the totals shown in Table 1 for these two 
years are those who had arrived in the six previous landing years (i.e. 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, and 2011 for 2012; and 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 for 2006) 
and who filed income taxes. This is done so that those immigrants counted in 2012 would 
reflect the admission decisions made by the Conservative Government after it came to 
office and those counted in 2006 could be attributed to admission decisions made by the 
previous Liberal Government. The immigrants arriving in the same year that the income 
tax is filed and earnings are calculated (i.e. 2006 and 2012) are excluded as they land at 
different times over the course of the year and their annual earnings, which are used as 
the indicator of the success of immigration policies in this paper, do not usually reflect a 
full year's participation in the labour market.  
 
Admittedly, the period of one-to-six years after landing used here is a very short one to 
use for analyzing the results of changes in immigration policy on labour market 
performance, but it does make use of all the data currently available and should provide a 
reasonable early indicator of whether the Conservative immigration policy changes are  
significantly improving the poor performance of recent immigrants in the labour market.  
 
The first thing worth noting in Table 1 is that the total number of immigrants included in 
the database has actually increased under the Conservatives. This is because the number 
of provincial nominees and dependents, family class, and live- in-caregivers increased 
even though the number of Federal skilled workers and dependents, and refugees landed 
in Canada, which bore the brunt of the tightening introduced in the reforms, actually 
decreased significantly. This indicates that clamping down on the Federal Skilled Worker 
Program and screening out non-qualified refugee claimants have not been enough by 
themselves to reduce the overall number of immigrants. 
 
The most meaningful indicator of the performance of recent immigrants in the labour 
market is their average employment earnings. It is a measure of how much they 
contribute to Canada’s GDP by their labour as employees and, since labour income is by 
far the largest category of income, of how much they can afford to pay to finance their 
share of Canada’s public spending. (Note: it would also make sense to include self-
employment income, but the combined data for employment and self-employment is not 
available in the tabulations.) 
 
The number of immigrants declaring employment income on their T1 Tax forms is shown 
in Table 2. This is smaller than the total number of immigrants filing tax returns in Table 
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1 because it only includes those with employment income and excludes those who filed 
income tax returns to declare self-employment income and non-wage income such as 
interest, dividends, capital gains, government transfers and to claim tax credits such as 
the child tax benefit or the GST credit. 
 
Average earnings are shown in Table 3. As stated above, this is the most meaningful 
available indicator of immigrants’ labour market performance. Interestingly, in spite of 
the very ambitious package of immigration reforms introduced by the Conservative 
Government in the face of strong opposition from advocates of mass immigration, the 
overall improvement in average earnings is relatively modest only rising to $31,333 in 
2012 from $28,666 in 2006. Moreover, since this was only slightly in excess of the 
growth of estimated annual earnings, average earnings only increased moderately to 74.4 
per cent of estimated overall average earnings in 2012, up from 71.9 per cent in 2006 
(Table 4).  
 
Unfortunately, a gap in earnings of this magnitude is large enough that it will still 
produce a growing fiscal burden from immigration due to the increase in the number of 
immigrants and will contribute to rising poverty in rapidly growing immigrant 
communities. On the other hand, it must be admitted that if the Conservative Government 
had not acted to tighten requirements under the Federal Skilled Worker Program and had 
instead admitted the over a million backlog that it legislated away, the gap in earnings 
would probably have risen substantially. But this cannot be proved with the data because 
it does not tell us anything about what the immigrants in the backlog would have earned 
if they had been admitted.  
 
While the performance of Federal Skilled Workers remained better than average, there 
was a decline in the ratio of their earnings to the overall average earnings (Tables 3 and 
4). This is surprising given the Conservative Government’s greater emphasis on 
employability and the decline in the number of skilled workers admitted (Table 1). 
Overall it must be regarded as a disappointing result for those expecting an improvement 
in the labour market performance of FSWs, which was the focus of the policy reforms. 
But perhaps this only reflects the deterioration in labour market conditions due to the 
2008-09 recession and subsequently and that without the reforms the situation would 
have deteriorated much more. 
 
While the performance of the Provincial/Territorial Nominees, principal applicants 
declined significantly (average earnings falling to $51,190 in 2012 from $51,687 in 2006) 
as their numbers increased (almost eightfold to 54,885 in 2012 from 7,015in 2006), their 
average earnings remained the highest of all the categories (121.6 percent of average 
annual earnings in 2006), thus bolstering the overall average earnings (Tables 3 and 4).  
The expansion of the PNP program under the Conservative Government has thus made a 
strong positive contribution to improving the labour market performance of immigrants. 
 
The Conservative Government’s measures to tighten up on refugee claims in the country 
by streamlining the process and introducing safe third country status were successful in 
reducing the number of claims in the preceding six years from 63,565 in 2006 to 49,285 
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in 2012. This facilitated an improvement in average annual earnings of these refugees 
from $22,453 in 2006 to$ 25,434 in 2012. 
 
The Conservative Government’s difficulty in improving overall performance of recent 
immigrants can probably be explained by three factors.  First, while its efforts to improve 
performance by tightening criteria for Federal Skilled Workers and rejecting non-eligible 
refugee claims were moves in the right direction (as can be seen for the latter by the 
decrease in the number of refugees landed in Canada), they were not sufficient to offset 
the depressing impact on performance of larger numbers of family class immigrants, and 
live-in care givers and dependents.  Second, the 2008-09 recession and its aftermath 
created a labour market that was particularly inhospitable for new immigrants.  In fact, in 
the past at least up until the late 1980s, when the old tap-on, tap-off immigration policy 
had been the order of the day, it had been the practice to scale back the number of 
immigrants in recessions and times of high unemployment. That this was not done in 
2008-09 probably contributed to the poorer than expected labour market performance of 
new immigrants. And third, the performance of business class immigrants and their 
spouses and dependents has remained disappointing even taking into account their 
reported income from self-employment. 
 
Federal Skilled Workers and Provincial Territorial Nominees are the only categories of 
workers that earn more than average. This is necessary if they are to be able to pay their 
own way and contribute their share of the government benefits enjoyed by all Canadians 
(Tables 3 and 4). 
 
Other categories of immigrants such as family class, live-in caregivers, and refugees (all 
of which have low relative earnings and are still admitted in large numbers) will continue 
to undercut the improved performance of skilled workers and provincial nominees. The 
poor performance of Family Class has particularly large impact in depressing average 
earnings because of their relatively large numbers (accounting for almost 29 per cent of 
the total number of persons included in the count in 2012). More specifically, the parents 
and grandparents included in family class come to Canada late in their life and usually 
have very little, if any, earning capacity in Canadian labour markets, make very small 
contributions to the financing of the health and social programs they take advantage of. 
 
It is very difficult for any Government to reduce the numbers of Family Class admitted in 
the future as established immigrants become citizens and voters and understandably like 
to have their family members join them. And, once immigrants are admitted and gain 
citizenship, it is considered by most Canadians to be unfair, not to mention un-Canadian, 
to discourage the extended families of immigrants from following. Thus in determining 
whether it is economically advantageous to admit skilled immigrants who are expected to 
do well, it is necessary to consider the implications of their admissions for subsequent 
Family Class immigrants who are not expected to do so well in the labour market and 
will probably require substantial Government assistance. This means that not only should 
the skilled immigrants be expected to pay their own way and contribute economically, 
but they must also be able make enough and contribute enough to compensate for their 
less successful family members who may impose a net fiscal cost on the country.  
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The Government’s failure to eliminate the live-in-caregiver category as part of its efforts 
to improve immigrant performance is difficult to understand on economic grounds given 
the low earnings and/or problems and administrative abuses associated with this category 
of immigrants.  But it is even worse and more costly to Canadians that the Government 
increased the number of live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents 
admitted over the six years preceding 2012 to 50,120 from 17,010 in 2006. This huge 
increase was accompanied by a reduction in average annual earnings to $26,747 in 2012 
from $28,505 in 2006. The retention of the program and such a large increase in numbers 
admitted only makes sense on political grounds as an effort to cater to certain immigrant 
communities who disproportionately take advantage of the program.  
 
Conclusions 
 
To its credit, the Conservative Government has introduced ambitious reforms in 
immigration policy since coming to office in January 2006. The Government sought and 
obtained legislative authority that gave it the discretion to eliminate a backlog of 
immigrants admitted under old criteria that were clearly not working and whose 
application would result in the admission of many who would encounter great difficulties 
adapting to the competitive Canadian labour market. This in my view is its greatest 
achievement as the admission of such a large number of under-qualified immigrants in a 
short period of time would probably have resulted in a substantial deterioration in the 
performance of recent immigrants and would have given rise to exorbitant fiscal costs. 
The Government also restructured the Federal Skilled Worker Program to put much 
greater weight on employability and arranged employment, which hopefully will produce 
much better results once the labour market fully recovers. And the Government deserves 
credit for reforming the refugee admission process to try to weed out non-genuine 
refugees. 
 
Notwithstanding the relatively ambitious reforms introduced, the measured overall 
performance of recent immigrants has not improved enough to substantially reduce the 
wide gap that has opened up between average recent immigrant and overall earnings. 
There are many reasons for this. But the most important is that the Conservative 
Government has continued to pursue a policy of high mass immigration admitting around 
250,000 new immigrants per year right through the 2008-09 recession, which created a 
particularly inhospitable labour market for new immigrants. Moreover, it would be 
unrealistic to expect the Conservative Government’s reforms in immigration policy, as 
desirable as they might be on their own merits, to by themselves produce the desired 
improvement in immigrant labour market performance as they applied to only a small 
proportion of immigrants with the largest proportion of immigrants not subject to labour 
market criteria. 
 
The only viable solution to the problem of the growing fiscal burden and rising 
immigrant poverty is a substantial reduction in the total number of immigrants admitted. 
But this, of course, is not something that a Canadian Government of any political stripe is 
yet likely to contemplate as it runs counter to that widespread belief that, regardless of the 
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strength of the Canadian economy and labour markets, Canada always needs more and 
more immigrants no matter how poorly they perform and how great of a fiscal burden 
they impose. More new immigrants may increase aggregate GDP, but they will decrease 
the living standards of existing Canadian residents unless they are able to earn at least as 
much as other Canadians and thereby pay their pro rata share of the social programs to 
which they become entitled as Canadians. This is the basic fact that Canadians need to 
recognize. 
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Table 1: Total Count by Immigrant Admission Category for Immigrants 
Landing in Previous Six Years in Number of Persons 
   
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2012 
Total 970,375 1,041,295 
Family class 289,590 299,885 
Business class, principal applicants 16,085 15,735 
Business class, spouses and dependents 29,700 30,555 
Skilled workers, principal applicants 249,920 201,450 
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents 209,010 168,730 
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants 7,015 54,885 
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents 7,790 53,085 
Government-assisted refugees 30,740 26,435 
Privately sponsored refugees 13,140 18,350 
Refugees landed in Canada 63,565 49,285 
Refugee dependents 15,460 15,165 
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and 
dependents 
17,010 50,120 
Backlog clearance program 105 0 
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public 
policy considerations 
21,260 57,645 
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the 
six previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2012). "Recent immigrants" landing in 
the year stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their 
annual earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, 
do not reflect a full year's participation in the labour market.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), 
http: 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&paSer=&
pattern=&stByVal=1&p1=1&p2=-1&tabMode=dataTable&csid= 
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Table 2: Total Count with Employment Earnings by Immigrant Admission 
Category for Immigrants Landing in Previous Four Years for Number of 
Persons with Earned Income 
   
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2012 
Total 656,400 701,385 
Family class 184,315 184,170 
Business class, principal applicants 6,555 6,515 
Business class, spouses and dependents 13,500 11,015 
Skilled workers, principal applicants 194,275 156,260 
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents 137,445 105,990 
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants 5,920 47,400 
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents 5,430 38,385 
Government-assisted refugees 18,815 13,455 
Privately sponsored refugees 9,720 12,025 
Refugees landed in Canada 41,205 31,700 
Refugee dependents 9,630 9,555 
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents 15,855 45,840 
Backlog clearance program 70 0 
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public 
policy considerations 
13,665 39,060 
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the 
six previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2012). "Recent immigrants" landing in 
the year stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their 
annual earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, 
do not reflect a full year's participation in the labour market.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), 
http: 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&paSer=&
pattern=&stByVal=1&p1=1&p2=-1&tabMode=dataTable&csid= 
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Table 3: Average Earnings by Immigrant Admission Category for 
Immigrants Landing in Previous Four Years in 2012 Constant Dollars 
   
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2012 
Total $28,666 $31,333 
Family class $22,886 $25,364 
Business class, principal applicants $23,635 $25,515 
Business class, spouses and dependents $13,490 $14,483 
Skilled workers, principal applicants $43,301 $44,901 
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents $21,502 $24,181 
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants $51,687 $51,190 
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents $18,526 $22,854 
Government-assisted refugees $16,583 $16,600 
Privately sponsored refugees $21,159 $22,184 
Refugees landed in Canada $22,453 $25,434 
Refugee dependents $14,233 $16,433 
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents $28,505 $26,747 
Backlog clearance program $26,143 $0 
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public 
policy considerations 
$25,568 $33,146 
Note:   
Total  Average Annual Earnings from SLID (Est for 2012) $39,885 $42,107 
Previous Six Year Cohort as Percentage of Total 71.87 74.41 
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the 
six previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2012). "Recent immigrants" landing in 
the year stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their 
annual earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, 
do not reflect a full year's participation in the labour market.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), 
http: 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&paSer=&
pattern=&stByVal=1&p1=1&p2=-1&tabMode=dataTable&csid= 
 
11 
 
Table 4: Average Earnings by Immigrant Admission Category for 
Immigrants Landing in Previous Four Years as Percentage of Canada-wide 
Average Earnings 
   
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2012 
Total 71.9 74.4 
Family class 57.4 60.2 
Business class, principal applicants 59.3 60.6 
Business class, spouses and dependents 33.8 34.4 
Skilled workers, principal applicants 108.6 106.6 
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents 53.9 57.4 
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants 129.6 121.6 
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents 46.4 54.3 
Government-assisted refugees 41.6 39.4 
Privately sponsored refugees 53.1 52.7 
Refugees landed in Canada 56.3 60.4 
Refugee dependents 35.7 39.0 
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents 71.5 63.5 
Backlog clearance program 65.5 0.0 
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public policy 
considerations 
64.1 78.7 
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the 
six previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2012). "Recent immigrants" landing in 
the year stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their 
annual earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, 
do not reflect a full year's participation in the labour market.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), 
http: 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&paSer=&
pattern=&stByVal=1&p1=1&p2=-1&tabMode=dataTable&csid= 
 
 
